Abstract Climate is simulated for reference and mitigation emissions scenarios from Integrated Assessment Models using the Bern2.5CC carbon cycle-climate model. Mitigation options encompass all major radiative forcing agents. Temperature change is attributed to forcings using an impulse-response substitute of Bern2.5CC. The contribution of CO 2 to global warming increases over the century in all scenarios. Non-CO 2 mitigation measures add to the abatement of global warming. The share of mitigation carried by CO 2 , however, increases when radiative forcing targets are lowered, and increases after 2000 in all mitigation scenarios. Thus, non-CO 2 mitigation is limited and net CO 2 emissions must eventually subside. Mitigation rapidly reduces the sulfate aerosol loading and associated cooling, partly masking Greenhouse Gas mitigation over the coming decades. A profound effect of mitigation on CO 2 concentration, radiative forcing, temperatures and the rate of climate change emerges in the second half of the century.
Introduction
This study assesses the role of individual radiative forcing (RF) agents in climate change and mitigation of climate change in emission scenarios for the twenty-first century. Global mean surface temperature is a central proxy for many of the impacts of climate change. We analyse the contributions of individual RF agents to the magnitude and the rate of temperature change over time, as well as the mitigated temperature change. A particular emphasis is placed on the rate of change in global mean temperature, which codetermines the impact of climate change and the costs of adaptation. By focusing on temperature rather than RF we are able to capture time lags of the climate system response. We also consider mitigation in the context of sea level rise as an important impact on a longer timescale, and of risks associated with high levels of CO 2 through effects other than global warming.
We investigate a set of reference and mitigation scenarios for global emissions of the major anthropogenic greenhouse gases (CO 2 , CH 4 , N 2 O, halocarbons, SF 6 ), aerosol and tropospheric ozone precursors (SO 2 , CO, NO x , VOCs) throughout this century. Most of the scenarios were generated as part of the Energy Modeling Forum project 21 (EMF-21) , with several Integrated Assessment Models (IAM): AIM (Fujino et al. 2006) , EPPA (Reilly et al. 2006) , IMAGE (van Vuuren et al. 2006) , IPAC (Jiang et al. 2006) , MESSAGE (Rao and Riahi 2006) , MiniCAM (Smith and Wigley 2006) . These IAMs are well known for providing comprehensive scenarios to climate modellers, inter alia the SRES illustrative scenarios used in the IPCC reports (Nakićenović and Swart 2000) . Summary IAM model descriptions are given in van Vuuren et al. (2008) .
The EMF-21 project is a collaboration of modelling groups assessing the potential of multigas mitigation policies. Before EMF-21, most attention in climate policy modeling was paid to reducing CO 2 emissions from the energy sector. In EMF-21, special attention was given to non-CO 2 GHGs and CO 2 sinks such as managed forests or carbon capture and storage facilities (CCS). Some of the IAMs participating in EMF-21 (MiniCAM, EPPA/ISGM, MERGE) also provided the multigas scenarios described in detail in Clarke et al. (2008) .
The IAMs represented here feature representations of the energy system and other parts of economy, such as trade and agriculture, on varying levels of spatial and process detail. Scenarios are generated by minimizing the total systems costs under the constraints set by societal drivers (population, welfare, technological innovation). Most scenarios are related to SRES ''storylines'' (Nakićenović and Swart 2000) (Table 1) . Adding a constraint on radiative forcing leads to scenarios with policies specifically aimed at mitigation (mitigation scenarios). Mitigation policies can be assessed by comparing these mitigation scenarios with corresponding scenarios that are not constrained to a forcing target (reference scenarios). The cost of climate change impacts is not explicitly considered in this scenario generation process. The mitigation scenarios analysed here are constrained by stabilization of total RF in the period 2100 to 2150 (RF target). All IAMs provided a multigas mitigation scenario with the common EMF-21 target of 4.5 Wm -2 with respect to the preindustrial state (taken as the year 1765 in the simulations). Additional scenarios are included with RF targets ranging from 2.6 to 5.3 Wm -2 (Table 1) . IAMs draw on a wide range of technological options representative of the current scientific debate to reduce GHG emissions in mitigation scenarios. Feasibility of these technologies is an implied assumption and is not addressed explicitly. This is true also for the reference scenarios, which feature important efficiency improvements unprompted by mitigation policies. It has been argued that baseline emissions could be much higher if technological development is less effective than assumed (Pielke et al. 2008) . The feasibility of additional improvements is presumably no less uncertain. Riahi et al. (2007) have addressed these issues by analyzing the contribution of selected technology clusters to mitigation with respect to several reference scenarios and at different levels of stringency. As already in Rao and Riahi (2006) , they emphasize the diversity of the mitigation portfolio, but also demonstrate that carbon sink technologies are consistently part of solutions to stringent forcing constraints.
All IAMs represented here include options for non-CO 2 mitigation that are cheaper than CO 2 mitigation, and the multigas mitigation scenarios generally imply lower costs than corresponding CO 2 -only scenarios (Fujino et al. 2006; Jiang et al. 2006; Rao and Riahi 2006; Reilly et al. 2006; Smith and Wigley 2006; van Vuuren et al. 2006) . On the other hand, non-CO 2 mitigation potentials are bounded by the total amount of non-CO 2 emissions in the reference scenarios, which remain inferior to the required CO 2 reduction over the century. Since models minimize mitigation costs, they produce mitigation scenarios that begin mostly with reductions of non-CO 2 gases and then follow with more expensive CO 2 mitigation. This is a well-known result that has been reported by several participant groups in EMF-21 (e.g., Rao and Riahi 2006; Smith and Wigley 2006; van Vuuren et al. 2006 ). Here we explore how this evolution of the mitigation portfolio affects global mean surface temperatures in mitigation scenarios.
Mitigation scenarios have been widely used to investigate options and measures to ''achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system'' (United Nations 1992). Comprehensive multigas mitigation scenarios as used in this paper, however, have only recently become available. Earlier mitigation scenarios are much less comprehensive in terms of relevant processes and forcing agents considered. They focus strongly on CO 2 , and only a few consider non-CO 2 agents (Schimel et al. 1997; Metz et al. 2001) .
The working group I parts of the IPCC Third and Fourth Assessment reports (TAR, AR4) discuss CO 2 concentration stabilization profiles, which implicitly are mitigation scenarios (Enting et al. 1994; Wigley et al. 1996; Prentice et al. 2001; Cubasch et al. 2001; Meehl et al. 2007; Plattner et al. 2008) . In contrast to the emission scenarios used here, in CO 2 stabilization profiles the CO 2 emissions are inferred in a top-down manner from predefined concentrations. The role of non-CO 2 GHGs in mitigation and stabilization is not considered. Neither of the two IPCC working group I reports include climate projections based on bottom-up multigas mitigation scenarios, which infer emissions from general development trends through explicit and detailed modelling of technological processes. Some participant groups in EMF-21 have reported results from climate projections of their IAM in the EMF-21 special issue on multigas scenarios. A more detailed investigation of climate projections for multigas scenarios has been published recently for three IAMs (MiniCAM, EPPA/ISGM, MERGE) by Levy II et al. (2008) .
We further analyse climate projections for a set of reference and mitigation scenarios from six different IAMs (Table 1) . Included are scenarios earmarked for simulations with Earth System Models (ESM) and Earth System models of intermediate complexity (EMIC) for the next IPCC Assessment report (AR5), termed Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP, Table 1 ). By using one EMIC to simulate RF and temperature across emission scenarios from a group of different IAMs, it is possible to separate general robust trends from model-dependent features. The range of global temperature projections for these mitigation and reference scenarios is discussed in van Vuuren et al. (2008) . Here we show how the different forcings (GHG and aerosols) give rise to the projected temperature evolution over this century, and how each of them affects this path as a result of various degrees of mitigation efforts. Specifically, we analyse (1) the contribution of forcing agents to climate change in the past and up to 2100, (2) the role of forcing agents for mitigation, (3) the mitigation effect on the rate of global mean temperature change and the contribution of individual RF agents to the overall warming rate.
Methods

Model
We use the Bern2.5CC EMIC to calculate RF and climate change from the emissions scenarios across the different IAMs, using the same model setup as in van Vuuren et al. (2008) . Most IAMs contain simple climate-carbon cycle model formulations, often based on MAGICC (Wigley and Raper 2001) or the Bern substitute model . By using one model for the carbon cycle-climate simulation we avoid differences that may arise from the somewhat different climate-carbon cycle representations within the IAMs.
Model components represent (1) the physical climate system, (2) the cycling of carbon and related elements, and (3), RF by atmospheric CO 2 , non-CO 2 greenhouse gases (GHG) and aerosols Joos et al. 2001) . The model setup used here includes only anthropogenic RF, solar variability and volcanism are not considered. Solar forcing over the twentieth century has been much smaller than the anthropogenic GHG forcing and reliable prediction of twenty-first century solar and volcanic forcing is lacking.
Apart from surface temperature, steric sea level rise, mostly a result of thermal expansion, is also calculated in Bern2.5CC. The Bern2.5CC steric sea level rise tends to be high in comparison with, e.g., the CMIP (Meehl et al. 2005 ) group of Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation models (AOGCMs; Plattner et al. 2008) , particularly when the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC), which is sensitive in the model, shuts down (Knutti and Stocker 2000) . We note that contributions from changes in ice sheets, alpine glaciers, and other terrestrial water storage are not taken into account here.
CO 2 RF is parametrized according to Myhre et al. (1998) , as described in Joos et al. (2001) and used in Forster et al. (2007) . RF of non-CO 2 GHGs is calculated as the product of concentrations and radiative efficiencies as given in Forster et al. (2007) . Non-CO 2 concentrations are modelled with first-order decay and atmospheric residence times partly depending on concentrations of other gases (Prather et al. 2001) . The RF of aerosols, which have very short residence times, is modelled as proportional to aerosol precursor emissions. For sulfate aerosols, SO 2 emissions are used, for organic and black carbon (OC/BC) aerosols, CO emissions are used as a proxy of incomplete combustion. The best estimates of aerosol forcing efficiencies (Forster et al. 2007 ), used for the simulations shown here, imply an important role of aerosols in the anthropogenic influence on climate. Aerosol RF in the scenarios used in this study is mostly due to sulfate aerosol. The remainder is a positive RF from organic and black carbon, which accounts for just a few percents. The RF by individual aerosol types and processes is uncertain, but total aerosol RF is constrained by observations and climate model simulations (Forster et al. 2007) . A detailed account of the non-CO 2 RF model is given in Joos et al. (2001) . Radiative efficiencies and life times are updated according to Forster et al. (2007) .
Feedbacks of atmospheric CO 2 and climate on carbon fluxes are captured by the explicit representation of the carbon cycle in the Bern2.5CC model. The atmospheric CO 2 concentration affects carbon uptake through CO 2 dissolution in the ocean and CO 2 fertilization on land. The climatecarbon cycle feedback arises from the dependence of soil carbon decay on temperature, the response of the global vegetation distribution to climate change, the temperaturedependent solubility of CO 2 in the ocean and changes in surface-to-deep transport and in the marine biological cycle (Joos et al. 1999; Joos et al. 2001; Plattner et al. 2001) , where the first of these factors is dominant in the model on a centennial timescale. Feedbacks for the non-CO 2 GHGs are not modeled. For example, methane is not represented in the carbon cycle model. A limited coverage of feedbacks is provided by the atmospheric chemistry parametrizations.
The model reference case is obtained with the standard setup of the carbon cycle model and an equilibrium climate sensitivity of 3.2 K for a nominal doubling of CO 2 . Climate and carbon cycle uncertainty (vertical bars in Fig. 1 ) is bounded by ''endmember'' combinations of assumptions: The uncertainty in climate sensitivity is accounted for by additional simulations with sensitivities of 1.5°C (low) and 4.5°C (high). The low-CO 2 case is obtained by applying an efficiently mixing ocean and assuming heterotrophic respiration to be independent of global warming; the high-CO 2 case is obtained by applying an inefficiently mixing ocean and capping CO 2 fertilization after the year 2000. A compound parameter uncertainty range was obtained by combining low-CO 2 with low climate sensitivity, and high-CO 2 with high climate sensitivity. The same approach was used in IPCC TAR and AR4 (Meehl et al. 2007; Joos et al. 2001; Prentice et al. 2001) .
Simulations start from an equilibrated model state for the year 1765 with zero RF. Until 2000, CO 2 , CH 4 , and N 2 O concentrations are prescribed according to ice core data and atmospheric observations as compiled by Joos and Spahni (2008) ; RF of the other non-CO 2 forcing agents in the past is calculated as described in Joos et al. (2001) , except for updated parametrizations as mentioned above, and a newer estimate of SO 2 emissions (Stern 2005) . From year 2000 onwards, simulations are driven by the emissions of CO 2 and non-CO 2 GHGs and aerosol precursors from the IAM scenarios. The scenarios were harmonized to a common emission level in the year 2000, as described in van Vuuren et al. (2008) .
Attribution method
The value of partitioning anthropogenic climate change by forcing agents lies in the separate consideration of gases or aerosols with differing dynamics and a different level of scientific understanding.
The need to deal with several components on an equal footing is commonly addressed by using the Global Warming Potential (GWP) measure. All scenario models featured here except AIM rely on GWPs to compare and substitute forcing agents . GWPs, though of practical use, are a limited concept that afford comparability of different forcing agents only with respect to a given time horizon, here 100 years. GHG emissions equivalent in terms of GWPs cause similar heat input to the climate system over 100 years, but the temperature response at any given time may differ. An alternative measure proposed for comparison of unit emissions of different GHGs is the Global Temperature Potential (GTP Shine et al. 2005) . GTPs take the climate response into account and are comparable in terms of temperature, but also strongly dependent on the time frame considered.
Some forcing agents have a well-known radiative efficiency, and some agreement exists about their future emission trajectory. Such is the case for the gases listed under the Montreal Protocol (all scenarios assume a phase out as defined in the protocol). On the other extreme, aerosols are characterized by strongly scenario-dependent, i.e., uncertain emissions and a poorly constrained radiative efficiency. In the IPCC AR4, aerosol RF is still assigned the greatest uncertainty of all forcing components (Forster et al. 2007) . By partitioning global temperature change into contributions from different forcings the varying uncertainties associated with each of them can be considered.
The attribution of global temperature change to RF agents requires that the individual effects are additive. Forster et al. (2007) suggest that this is a good assumption, as studies with several different GCMs ''have found no evidence of any nonlinearity for changes in GHGs and sulphate aerosol''. A linear approximation of the Bern2.5CC climate model is given by the impulseresponse substitute formulation :
where dT is the deviation of global mean surface air temperature from the preindustrial state, R is radiative forcing, R 2 9 is the RF for twice the preindustrial CO 2 concentration, dT 2 9 is the equilibrium temperature change corresponding to R 2 9 , r is an impulse-response function, c is the heat capacity of water per unit volume, h is the depth of the mixed ocean surface layer, a oc is the fraction of the earth surface covered by oceans, and t is time. The impulseresponse function is given as
where a ij ,s ij are two sets of coefficients and time scales, respectively. They define two functions for the short and the long term response, which are matched around year 4. The temperature response of the Bern2.5CC model is not strictly linear, as ocean circulation can change in response to climate change and lead to a feedback affecting Reference scenarios (dashed), and mitigation scenarios (solid) are shown for all emission models. Bars to the right of the graphs mark ranges in 2100 of uncertainty in climate sensitivity (solid), and carbon cycle and climate sensitivity combined (dotted) for the two bounding scenarios. The uncertainty bar of the high-end scenario (MESSAGE A2) extends beyond the plot range of CO 2 and temperature; climate sensitivity uncertainty is bounded at 1020 ppm and 6.4 K, total uncertainty at 1305 ppm and 8.3 K, respectively. Where the dotted uncertainty range for sea level is not visible, the carbon cycle settings are partly compensating the climate sensitivity settings (see main text) ocean heat uptake. Thus the substitute model does not reproduce the temperature changes simulated with the original Bern2.5CC perfectly. However, in the range of conditions and timescales considered here, this nonlinearity is small , with substitute model temperatures at 2100 within 0.2°C of the complete model, except in the sensitivity simulations with high climate sensitivity or low-CO 2 settings combined with high RF, where most substitute simulations are about 0.5°C too small, and the ones with the highest RF up to more than 1°C too small. This nonlinearity arises due to strong changes in the AMOC which occur under strong warming. However, for the scenarios considered here, the relative contributions of different forcings are less sensitive, because they are all similarly affected by the deviation between Bern2.5CC and its substitute. Thus the separation of the individual forcing contributions is reliable.
The global mean surface temperature change attributable to each GHG or aerosol, dT i is obtained by solving Eq. 1 for the corresponding forcing R i , with P i dT i = dT for the sum over all forcings.
In the standard setup of Bern2.5CC with a climate sensitivity of dT 2 9 = 3.2°C, global temperature change affects ocean and land uptake of carbon, resulting in a positive climate-carbon cycle feedback. This leads to higher atmospheric CO 2 . The temperature change due to CO 2 without the carbon cycle-climate feedback is obtained by inserting in Eq. 1 the RF corresponding to the atmospheric CO 2 from a Bern2.5CC simulation with climate sensitivity set to zero in Bern2.5CC. The temperature change in the standard simulation results from all anthropogenic forcing agents including CO 2 , non-CO 2 GHGs, and aerosols.
The relationship between RF and climate change is affected by the uncertainty in climate sensitivity. However, this uncertainty affects all forcings in a similar way, except for CO 2 , which is influenced by the climate-carbon cycle feedback. The climate-carbon cycle feedback plays a limited role in the results discussed here. The warmings due to this feedback are governed by the main temperature response of each scenario and vary accordingly. This variation among scenarios is small compared with the total warming and does not greatly affect the temperature differences between the scenarios in the standard model setup. The feedback generally amplifies the general warming trend and therefore does not introduce a qualitatively different behaviour (Fig. 2) .
The carbon cycle uncertainty for the substitute simulations was estimated using the RF from the Bern2.5CC sensitivity simulations as described in Sect. 2.1.
A similar decomposition of temperature change for different forcings has been done before, to allocate mitigation burdens according to historical responsibility for climate change (den Elzen et al. 2005; den Elzen and Schaeffer 2002; Trudinger and Enting 2005) . This necessitates an attribution of climate change to emissions, and, unlike the RF-temperature relationship, involves essential nonlinearities and a choice among several possible attribution formalisms. Table 1 . Attribution to individual forcings is done using the Bern2.5CC substitute model. The net temperature change (shown by black ''ticks'' next to the bars) corresponds to the total bar height minus the negative contributions from aerosols. Error bars indicate uncertainty related to the carbon cycle settings (cf. Sect. 2.2). The pulse-response range given here differs slightly from the full model-range given in Sect. 3
Results
The reference scenarios (Table 1 ) provide a range of plausible future emissions in the absence of specific mitigation policies. These emissions lead to climate change characterized by global mean surface air temperature rise above preindustrial levels by the year 2100 of 3-3.5°C for scenarios based on the B2 storyline and about 4.5-5°C for others, not including the climate and carbon cycle model uncertainty ( Fig. 1; Table 1 ). The corresponding range in RF is 6-7 Wm -2 (B2), and 9-10 Wm -2 (others), respectively; the range in CO 2 is 650-760 ppm (B2), and 900-960 ppm (others), respectively.
The mitigation scenarios demonstrate that the implementation of technological measures and political mechanisms for mitigation can have a profound impact on the climate change expected under the same scenario storylines. The set of mitigation scenarios considered here includes scenarios with radiative forcing targets from 2.6 to 5.3 Wm -2 (Fig. 1) . Global temperature deviations in 2100 range from 1.8 to 2.8 K above preindustrial levels at the standard climate sensitivity of 3.2°C. Simulated RF and CO 2 are in the range of 2.7-5.1 Wm -2 and 400-619 ppm, respectively.
Trends in the year 2100 indicate that radiative forcing is stabilized by the end of this century in many mitigation scenarios (IMAGE 2.6-3.7 Wm -2 , IPAC-EMF, MES-SAGE-EMF), or close to stabilization (IMAGE 5.3 Wm -2 , EPPA-EMF, see Fig. 1 ). A number of mitigation scenarios show a negative forcing trend in 2100 (IMAGE 2.6-2.9, MESSAGE 3.2-4.6).
Temperatures respond to stabilizing RF levels with some delay. While the temperatures for the more stringent mitigation scenarios seem stable in 2100 or even declining, the temperatures for the scenarios that comply with the 4.5 Wm -2 target of the EMF are still rising in 2100. However, the rate of temperature increase and therefore of climate change is greatly reduced with respect to the reference scenarios.
Sea level responds to global warming by thermal expansion on centennial to millenial timescales. The contrast between the reference and mitigation scenarios appears later than with temperature and evolves more slowly, and accordingly, none of the mitigation scenarios show a stabilized sea level in 2100. However, the simulations still indicate a mitigation potential of 1-2 tenths of a meter until 2100. The reference scenarios span a range of 0.41-0.60 m above the preindustrial sea level, as opposed to 0.27-0.40 m for the mitigation scenarios. Further, steric sea level rise is markedly decelerating in all mitigation scenarios while in all the reference scenarios it is still accelerating in 2100.
Thus, the magnitude and the rate of climate change and steric sea level rise, as well as the trends at the turn of the twent-second century show a substantial abatement due to mitigation policies.
The uncertainty in carbon cycle and climate feedbacks as defined in Sect. 2.1 strongly affects the effects and impacts of emissions (Fig. 1) . For example, for the MES-SAGE A2-based reference scenario, the climate sensitivity range of 1.5-4.5°C for a nominal doubling of CO 2 in 2100 translates to a range of 883-1,015 ppm for atmospheric CO 2 and 2.9-6.4°C for global mean surface temperature, respectively. The carbon cycle uncertainty corresponds to a range of 800-1213 ppm and 4.2-6.0°C, and the combined climate-carbon cycle uncertainty to a range of 789-1,305 ppm, and 2.6-8.3°C, respectively. For comparison, the multimodel range of CO 2 SRES-A2 projections from the C4MIP project (Friedlingstein et al. 2006) , is 730-1,020 ppm in 2100. Non-CO 2 RF is not included in C4MIP, thus temperature projections are not comparable. The likely (in the IPCC sense) range given in the IPCC AR4 Summary for Policymakers for an A2 scenario is 2.7-6.1°C above preindustrial for global mean surface air temperature in the last decade of this century, assuming a pre-2000 warming of 0.7°C, which corresponds to the Bern2.5CC simulation with the standard setup and is compatible with observations (Alley et al. 2007) . Though the feedback strength determining the absolute climate response remains fairly uncertain, the contrast from reference to mitigation scenarios is qualitatively similar in any setup.
The uncertainty range for steric sea level rise is related to that of surface temperature, with two exceptions: (1) for a time scale of one century it is more limited at the upper end (0.72 m in 2100 for MESSAGE A2 reference) because it takes more time to heat up the ocean, and (2) the carbon cycle sensitivity settings have partly compensating effects: In the low-CO 2 case, for example, efficient ocean mixing means relatively stronger ocean heat uptake and thermal expansion, but at the same time, atmospheric CO 2 and surface temperatures driving sea level rise are lower, partly due to increased ocean uptake, but mostly due to increased land carbon storage. The converse applies to the high-CO 2 case.
The contribution of forcing agents to climate change in the past and in this century
In 2000, the most important GHG, CO 2 , accounts for about the same global mean surface temperature change since preindustrial as do the other GHGs combined. The simulated cooling by aerosols in 2000 offsets about half of the warming by all GHGs (Fig. 2) .
However, the share of warming caused by CO 2 increases after the year 2000 in all scenarios. By 2100, it accounts for twice the warming attributed to the non-CO 2 GHGs or more in many scenarios, particularly some mitigation scenarios (cf. Sect. 3.2). Toward the end of the century, the share of GHG warming attributable to CO 2 decreases again slightly only for the scenarios MESSAGE 3.2 (after 1960) and MESSAGE 4.5 (after 1990). MESSAGE mitigation scenarios feature the steepest reduction of net CO 2 emissions in the set. The climate-carbon cycle feedback contributes to the growing influence of CO 2 . It is comparable in magnitude to the individual non-CO 2 GHGs.
The partitioning of non-CO 2 GHG warming varies across models. In the reference scenarios, generally CH 4 ranks first, followed by tropospheric ozone, N 2 O, HFCs/ PFCs/SF 6 and the Montreal gases and stratospheric ozone. This pattern is less clear in the mitigation scenarios, as different GHGs can be reduced at different rates. Nevertheless, in all cases CH 4 is still the most important non-CO 2 gas (cf. Sect. 3.2). Model-specific differences are apparent, e.g., CH 4 contributes a particularly large fraction of non-CO 2 warming in all MESSAGE scenarios.
Aerosol cooling peaked in the seventies, offsetting 75% of GHG warming around 1970 (not shown). Since then, global SO 2 emissions have stagnated and eventually declined according to the estimate used here (Stern 2005 ). This decline is immediately expressed in aerosol RF, leading to stagnating aerosol cooling while GHG warming continued. The decline of SO 2 emissions is projected to continue into the future in reference and mitigation scenarios alike, while the OC/BC aerosol loading as estimated here does not show consistent decrease. However, the net positive forcing due to OC/BC aerosols never fully compensates the sulfate aerosol cooling as simulated for any of the scenarios.
The role of forcing agents in mitigation
The attribution to individual RF agents of the difference in warming between the mitigation and baseline cases (Fig. 3) , reveals the shares of CO 2 and non-CO 2 GHGs in mitigation.
Total non-CO 2 emission abatement accounts for up to about 80% of the mitigated warming in the first decades of the century. However, CO 2 mitigation increases over time, and ends up as the clear leader in terms of avoided temperature change in all mitigation scenarios towards the end of the century. Scenarios with moderate mitigation targets (e.g. the EMF-21 scenarios with a 4.5 Wm -2 target) tend to rely proportionally more on the non-CO 2 GHGs for mitigation than those with more stringent targets. Non-CO 2 mitigation options tend to be relatively cheap compared to CO 2 , but more limited in their potential to reduce RF. Accordingly, CO 2 mitigation comes in when the cheap non-CO 2 options are exhausted or a more stringent forcing target must be reached. Models which provided scenarios at several RF targets (IMAGE, MESSAGE, MiniCAM) show little flexibility of non-CO 2 mitigation options to the level of stringency; almost all mitigation beyond the EMFtarget of 4.5 Wm -2 is achieved through CO 2 (cf. van Vuuren et al. 2006) . Thus, the previously reported preference for non-CO 2 mitigation in an early phase, and conversely, the shift towards a greater role fort CO 2 mitigation at later times and more stringent targets (e.g., Rao and Riahi 2006; van Vuuren et al. 2006 ) is consistent accross the scenario set, and reflects clearly in the projected warming.
In the non-CO 2 mitigation portfolio, CH 4 ranks first in importance, followed by HFCs/PFCs/SF 6 and tropospheric ozone, and finally N 2 O, which often constitutes a minor category. The share of warming due to each GHG does not always correspond to its importance in the mitigation portfolio, as some emissions (e.g., N 2 O) are harder to control than others. Due to its comparatively long lifetime of about 120 years, the share of N 2 O mitigation tends to increase over the long term. The amplification of the mitigation effect by the climate-CO 2 feedback is of similar importance as the minor non-CO 2 GHGs.
There is some variability between models and scenarios as to the non-CO 2 mitigation portfolio, which depends on the scenario assumptions and the variable implementation of mitigation options in the models. The comparison of the mitigation portfolios is complicated by the fact that different baseline scenarios are used. For example, MES-SAGE 4.5 is based on an A2 scenario, while MESSAGE-EMF shares the same forcing target, but uses a B2 scenario as reference. The B2 storyline emphasises technological development, and consequentially many technologies with a mitigation potential are already implemented in the baseline and do not contribute to the mitigated warming shown in Fig. 3 (Riahi et al. 2006) . Because different baseline scenarios are used, the most stringent mitigation targets do not always coincide with the strongest mitigation (MESSAGE 4.5, EPPA-EMF). In the case of MESSAGE, the 3.2 Wm -2 forcing target cannot be reached from the A2 baseline, but from the B2 baseline it can. The potential of the mitigation options considered is not sufficient to compensate for the difference in the socio-economical drivers assumed in the two scenarios. Thus the feasibility of a mitigation target is conditional on the storyline assumption (Riahi et al. 2006) .
As SO x emissions are related to the use of fossil fuels (especially coal), and fossil fuels get ''cleaner'' in baseline and mitigation scenarios alike, mitigation measures lead to a sizeable reduction of the aerosol load. This reduction is especially pronounced in the stringent scenarios that cut CO 2 emissions early on (Fig. 3) . In the first decades of the twenty-first century, the warming due to SO 2 emission abatement rivals the cooling due to GHG mitigation in many scenarios, especially those with stringent targets. While aerosol abatement is a co-benefit for air pollution reduction, it potentially lessens the impact of mitigation measures in the early twenty-frist century (e.g., Smith and Wigley 2006; van Vuuren et al. 2006) . Furthermore, it increases the uncertainty of climate projections over this period. However, the warming due to aerosol abatement tends to quickly stabilise, while GHG abatement leads to increasing mitigation. This is due to the fact that in the mitigation scenarios, the bulk of aerosol precursor emission reductions occurs in the first half of the century and then reaches a minimum level, while the reference scenarios reduce less and later.
Warming rate and the role of forcing agents
The rate of change in temperature and other climatic variables is an issue of importance quite independent of that of the mitigation target and stabilization level. Rates of change codetermine the impact of climate change and costs of adaptation (e.g., Adger et al. 2007 ).
Mitigation does not show strong effects on temperature evolution over several decades. Several factors explain this slow start. The first is inertia in the climate system and in the socio-technological system. The second is that the ''deadline'' of the RF target is still too far to induce substantial mitigation efforts in the scenarios with moderate targets. The third is sulfate aerosol abatement as discussed in Sect. 3.2. Scenarios with stringent RF targets show particularly rapid and strong SO 2 emission abatement. Due to the very short atmospheric lifetime of aerosols, highaerosol warming rates can result (Fig. 3, bottom) . Consequently, even in aggressive mitigation scenarios global temperature increases at rates not far below the baseline rates of change until the mid twenty-frist century (Fig. 4) . A similar result has been reported for the IMAGE (van Vuuren et al. 2006 ) and for the MiniCAM scenarios (Smith and Wigley 2006) using the climate component of these IAMs (MAGICC). The second half of the century only reveals the huge difference between baseline and mitigation scenarios.
Some mitigation scenarios show a trend reversal in rates of temperature change for certain forcings (particularly, CH 4 , tropospheric and stratospheric O 3 from IMAGE and MiniCAM). Rates of temperature change due to CO 2 are strongly decreased in the more ambitious mitigation scenarios, and negative rates (including the climate-carbon cycle feedback) are seen in the IMAGE 2.6 and the MESSAGE 3.2 scenarios. This is the delayed response to atmospheric CO 2 levels receding since the 2050ies in these scenarios as a result of major CO 2 emission reductions.
While warming decelerates in mitigation scenarios as stabilization at the forcing target is approached (-0.01 to 0.18°C /decade over the last 25 years), it further accelerates in the references (0.26-0.54°C/decade). Thus the substantial difference in the temperature levels reached in 2100 builds up during quite a short period. Looking further (Trenberth et al. 2007) ahead after 2100, it is clear that this gap must continue to widen drastically, as the emissions and warming trends of the reference scenarios continue unchecked through the year 2100.
Discussion and conclusions
Simulated CO 2 warming, non-CO 2 GHG warming, and net aerosol cooling are about equal in magnitude in the year 2000. Later in the century, the cooling influence of sulfate aerosols decreases while the temperature change due to GHGs continues to grow, led by the main GHG, CO 2 . The relative contribution of CO 2 to the total warming increases in all scenarios with respect to the year 2000. Only in the scenarios with the strongest CO 2 drawdown (MESSAGE 4.5, 3.2) this share starts declining again towards the end of the century. There are several reasons behind this shift. First, activities that cause CO 2 emissions (mostly energy use) are projected to grow much faster than activities that cause emissions of the major non-CO 2 GHGs CH 4 and N 2 O (mostly agriculture). Second, while oceans and the terrestrial biosphere absorb much of the emitted CO 2 , a sizeable fraction accumulates in the atmosphere and remains airborne for hundreds and even thousands of years. In contrast, the major non-CO 2 GHGs (CH 4 , tropospheric O 3 , N 2 O) are relatively short-lived. Third, the contribution from the carbon cycle-climate feedback is growing in the course of the century. Finally, the potential of non-CO 2 abatement to reduce RF is limited. To offset CO 2 warming over longer times, ever increasing emission cuts in non-CO 2 agents would be necessary, eventually exhausting the non-CO 2 mitigation potential. Thus the situation seen primarily in scenarios with moderate RF targets where non-CO 2 GHGs contribute an important share to mitigation, is transitory. Stabilization of scenarios complying with the EMF-21 target at RF levels reached in 2100 implies an equilibrium global mean temperature change of about 4°C above preindustrial assuming standard model settings. Even such moderate mitigation would require that net CO 2 emissions be eventually reduced to very low levels compared to today, as demonstrated by the allowable emissions calculated for corresponding stabilization pathways (e.g., Plattner et al. 2008) . The limited potential of non-CO 2 mitigation is already apparent before 2100, in that the share of mitigation due to CO 2 emission cuts increases with the stringency of the RF target (cf. Rao and Riahi 2006; van Vuuren et al. 2006) . Almost all mitigation beyond the EMF-target of 4.5 Wm -2 is achieved through CO 2 abatement. Sink technologies are instrumental to make these additional net CO 2 emissions reductions possible (Rao and Riahi 2006; Smith and Wigley 2006; van Vuuren et al. 2006) . The feasibility of sink options such as CCS and afforestation on an appropriate scale is, however, uncertain.
Mitigation of rising atmospheric CO 2 concentrations is important not only with respect to climate change, but also with respect to the impacts of elevated CO 2 on natural ecosystems, particularly ocean acidification. Steinacher et al. (2008) show that the Arctic surface ocean will become corrosive to the aragonite shells of marine organisms for CO 2 above about 460 ppm. In the most stringent scenarios, this concentration is not exceeded. The impact of elevated CO 2 concentrations on agriculture and possibly other ecosystem services may be favorable, but is also very uncertain (Fischlin et al. 2007 ). These are additional reasons why CO 2 mitigation is not substitutable and why focusing on non-CO 2 mitigation can only be a short-to-medium term strategy.
Although non-CO 2 mitigation does not rid us of the need to tackle CO 2 emissions, it does lend flexibility to the mitigation problem. Non-CO 2 mitigation is a significant item in the mitigation portfolio, accounting for the greater part of mitigated warming until mid-century in many scenarios. In the context of a given stabilization target, the abatement of non-CO 2 RF increases the cumulative allowable CO 2 emissions. Consequently, the consideration of non-CO 2 options lead to significantly lower simulated costs of mitigation (Fujino et al. 2006; Jiang et al. 2006; Rao and Riahi 2006; Reilly et al. 2006; Smith and Wigley 2006; van Vuuren et al. 2006) . While temperature increases above the preindustrial average projected for 2100 exceed present levels by several times, the speed at which we experience global change today is already very high in historical context. Joos and Spahni (2008) show that rates of change in RF from CO 2 , CH 4 , and N 2 O in the twentieth century are at least an order of magnitude higher than during the past 20000 yr. They find that the current rate of change in net anthropogenic RF exceeds decadal-scale rates of change in natural forcings of the last millenium. The reference scenarios show how failure to address climate mitigation can lead to acceleration of RF change further beyond the natural range. Projected temperatures rise at multi-decadal rates unprecedented at global scale in the documented human experience (e.g., Esper et al. 2002; Mann and Jones 2003) , reaching about 0.3°C/decade (B2 storylines), and about 0.5°C/decade (others), respectively. Considerably higher rates of climate change are possible if the assumptions on efficiency improvements and lowered carbon intensities in these reference scenarios prove too optimistic (Pielke et al. 2008) .
IAMs tend to implement costly mitigation efforts as late as it is compatible with the forcing target. Additionally, the implementation of abatement policies is also impeded by socio-economic inertia. Nevertheless, substantial CO 2 emission abatement starts before about 2030 in all mitigation scenarios and earlier for the lowest targets, because the RF target is a strong constraint on the cumulative CO 2 emissions over the century. Non-CO 2 emission abatement starts even earlier than CO 2 abatement. This is related to the use of GWP as a constant exchange rate between the prices of emission reductions in different GHGs. Early abatement of short-lived GHGs such as methane is not cost-effective in the context of a RF target for the year 2100 (Manne and Richels 2001; van Vuuren et al. 2006 ), but can nonetheless be considered to be beneficial and reasonable (van Vuuren et al. 2006) , since the ''deadline'' at 2100 is arbitrary and as such no basis for delaying mitigation.
Despite early inception of mitigation efforts, warming progresses at similar rates in mitigation as in reference scenarios over the first half of the century. Climate inertia delays the response of global temperature to emission reductions, and adds commited warming carried over from twentieth century emissions. A further delay can arise from aerosol abatement as a by-product of mitigation efforts. In the second half of the century, however, the impact of mitigation efforts unfolds, with drastically reduced rates of change in CO 2 , RF, and temperature in the mitigation scenarios. In 2100, rates of temperature change are below simulated present levels in all mitigation scenarios, and even reach zero for the lowest RF targets of around 3 Wm -2 . Timely and extensive mitigation efforts addressing emissions of all RF agents, in particular CO 2 , are required to avoid a further acceleration of climate change.
